Random Thoughts on Ventilation

Good in-service training not only forces you to perform skills with which you are familiar, but it also makes you confront your weaknesses and deficiencies at the same time. The recent night exercises provided the annual opportunity to review many of the basic skills that make up fireground operations, but they also revealed a glaring weakness that we, as a department, have had for years: a misunderstanding of fundamental ventilation theories and applications. There was much discussion and debate, with many good points and perspectives but, unfortunately, an equal amount of misconception and half-truth. Rather than putting together a flowery, technically detailed text discussing all possible phases of fireground ventilation, let’s talk very simply and directly about some of the areas of misunderstanding.

First things first: we should never perform any task at a fire because "…that’s what we always do" or "…that’s the way we do things here" or "…that’s what the book says." Fireground decisions absolutely must be the result of clear decision-making based on a solid understanding of the situation at hand and the effect our actions may have on that situation. Blindly following an operational guideline or mindlessly reproducing something someone told you about one time at the kitchen table is a recipe for disaster. The unfortunate thing about bad habits is that when we form them, execute them, and reinforce them, they become known as good habits. This unfortunate irony is truer with ventilation than it is with any other fireground operation. Just because you get away with something doesn’t make it right; injuries and deaths are often caused by actions that were previously performed many times without trouble but, in the wrong scenario, caused disastrous events.

We cannot decide on the proper tactic to use at a fire if we do not understand what the tactic is designed to accomplish and how it will accomplish it. A fantastic summation of this idea can be found in the after-action report from the fatal fire in Lorton this year, in which the ventilation tactics were identified as improper. Deputy Chief Burke (FCFRD) wrote: "ventilation should be coordinated and serve a purpose." Too simple? Not on your life. It is brilliant because it sums up the problem with the majority of our ventilation operations: they are performed with no thought of the effect they will have on the situation. Ventilation, in and of itself, is not necessarily a good thing; in fact, it can often produce horrible consequences when ill-conceived or incorrectly timed. Proper ventilation is not only a question of where and how we vent, but most importantly, when. We should process a ton of information before we ever touch the building with a tool.

What should we be thinking of when the time comes to select a ventilation strategy? Here are some key considerations for anyone in this position:

o Where is the fire? What stage of growth is it in? Where is it going? What is the extent of the smoke condition? How is the smoke behaving?

o What is the building made of? What do they use it for? How is the interior configured? What is the fire load? What effect is the building having on fire growth and spread?

o Where are the victims? How is the fire affecting them? How may it affect them as it grows and spreads? What will it take for us to remove them?

o What is the status/progress of the initial attack line? Is the line sufficient to contain the fire? Will additional lines be needed?

o Where are the other operating crews? Are they exposed to spreading fire? Are they protected by lines or interior compartments? Will our venting affect them and their actions positively or negatively?

An operational guideline, such as a NOVA manual, is just that: a guideline. It is designed to give advice to responding officers on their apparatus positioning, considerations, and tactics, which will work for them in the majority of cases. Any operational guideline, at any time, may be altered at the discretion of the officer in charge. Performing a task that is incorrect for a given situation, and then excusing it because "…that’s what the book says", is a mistake. There are places in the manuals where clear, emphatic language is used, such as: "…PPV shall NOT be used in balloon-frame construction." Other than in these rare cases, the language used is usually quite vague and open-ended; this is by design, as the guidelines they describe are not absolute, but involve some degree of decision-making by the officer in charge.

Let’s return to the scenario at hand: a fire in a row or townhouse. The NOVA manual has a few things to say on the subject, none of which is an absolute rule on how to perform ventilation. Let’s review these statements (emphasis of key words will be added by the author):

Ø "…ventilation of this type of structure during a fire should generally be achieved through natural horizontal methods." (5.1.11)

Ø "The need for rooftop openings typically will only be required when the fire has entered the attic area or has gained access to the vertical void spaces." (5.1.12)

Ø "In most cases, ventilation should occur from the top down, using windows as the avenue for hot gases to escape." (7.2.5)

Ø "Generally, the roof will not need to be ventilated unless the fire has entered the attic area, extended into the structure walls, or has considerable hold of the top floor" (7.5.5)

Now without being overly critical, I think it is fair to say that these quotes are far from being set in stone or absolute. In fact, I would submit that they reflect the operations that are more commonly encountered, rather than those that are the correct ones to take in the event of a fire. Bear with me:

Is it fair and accurate to say that securing a water supply is a priority at all fires? Would I change your answer to that question if I was to say that: "fires in townhouses are in most cases extinguished with booster tank water," or "generally a water supply will only be needed if the fire has extended past the room of origin," or "the need for supply lines typically will only be required if multiple attack lines are operated?" All of these statements have some truth to them, if you are speaking strictly in terms of what is encountered on the majority of fire responses. However, very few of us would argue with the importance of a water supply at a working fire, even if history tells us that we generally don’t need the hydrant water to put the fire out.

Apply this same logic to the subject of ventilation. If we have a small fire in a single room, (which is the most common scenario we face), it may not be necessary to vertically ventilate, as the ventilation strategy will be more geared toward improving visibility and removing "cool" smoke. However, if we have a fire that involves one or more rooms, or the potential to spread to other parts of the structure, our strategy shifts toward controlling the fire and its effects on the structure and victims. Stopping lateral fire spread, limiting the mushrooming of smoke and gases, and preventing rapid fire growth events, (such as flashover and smoke explosions,) become the goal. In these cases vertical ventilation should become a priority, as its ability to accomplish these goals is significant, and the consequences of improper horizontal ventilation in some situations can be extreme.

The problem with addressing issues the way the NOVA manuals address ventilation is that it is much easier for operating members to "ramp down" than it is to "ramp up." If we show up knowing that securing a water supply is a priority, even if we won’t use it, we are more likely to be successful than we would be if we waited for a chief to order us to secure one. In section 7.5.6 of the townhouse manual, it is stated that "vertical, rooftop ventilation should be accomplished through common methods, when ordered by command." If we wait for an order before beginning the process to cut a hole in a roof, reflex time is going to beat us every time, (which ironically fits in nicely with some people’s argument that vertical ventilation "takes too long.") Without vertical ventilation as a priority, we will start off doing something else, receive the order to cut the roof, drop what we are doing, gather tools, select and place ladders, start the saw, etc., etc. Meanwhile, what is the fire doing to that horrifying lightweight roof that we are so afraid of? What type of fire growth is occurring in the interior? If we set out with vertical ventilation as a priority, we can always stand down if the fire tells us to do so; however, if we never consider going to the roof until the chief decides we might need to open the roof, then all of the tremendous benefits of that operation will be lost while we get our act together.

So why should vertical ventilation be a primary consideration at a townhouse fire? Here is a partial list:

Ø Attached structures always present serious exposure problems if lateral fire spread is allowed to happen. If we wait for the fire to involve the attic space, it is often too late to stop the lateral spread, especially in very old or very new buildings.

Ø The lack of windows on every side makes horizontal vent opportunities limited. As a rule, we are supposed to open windows opposite of the nozzle; what if there is no window there? Do we open a window behind the nozzle and draw the fire toward the line? How do you "cross-ventilate" when there is nowhere for the vented heat, smoke, and gases to escape?

Ø Townhouses have an unenclosed stairwell that runs from the lowest level to the highest. Opening the roof sufficiently will protect the occupants of the upper floors, as mushrooming will be limited. Even a small fire on a lower floor can be deadly if mushrooming is allowed to occur—especially in energy efficient buildings.

Ø New age, energy efficient homes are tighter and better insulated than ever before. Flashovers are not more common today, but they are more often occurring after we arrive. Because the fire is often stifled until we begin our operations, fireground tactics, particularly the opening of windows and doors, is having a greater effect than ever. Breaking windows often speeds the "pre-flashover" fire growth to the point where searching members are caught when flashover happens. By opening the roof early, we are releasing the superheated gases before they can be ignited by the growing fire. The ability to release these gases by window alone is limited, especially when the number and size of windows is limited.

For those of us who believe that horizontal venting is always a good idea, think back to an article, report, or case study you read in which operating members were trapped, injured, or killed by spreading fire that "took off" when a window failed, causing a rapid fire growth event. Would it make any difference to those members if the failure was caused by heating from the fire, or from the swing of a halligan bar? Just because it is smoky, dark, and warm in a room does not mean breaking a window will help; this belief is the unfortunate result of a "burn-building" culture in which our familiarity with fire spread in a fireproof, unfurnished, drill building makes us unable to predict fire spread in an actual structural fire. Opening a window in the burn building and opening one in an actual structural fire are two totally different animals. The smoke may actually clear for a minute when that window is broken, like it does in the burn building, but what do you think is going to happen if we can’t contain the fire behind a closed door, or hit it with an attack line? Horizontal venting can never be thoughtless and automatic; it has to be well-timed and well-placed or big trouble is coming. PS: Next time you are at the burn building, with a decent fire going, open the windows in that room and then watch the temperature gauge on your TIC— you may be surprised by what you see.

Is vertical ventilation the "be-all end-all" of fireground operations? Of course not. There are situations where its benefits are limited by building construction and fire growth characteristics, or it is too dangerous to attempt because of a hazardous condition that cannot be overcome. However, it is very hard to argue that having a large opening over the fire in a top-floor fire, or over the stairs in a lower-floor fire, is not a huge benefit when the fire is serious in nature. What is a serious fire? The book says "…if the fire has considerable hold of the top floor." I would argue that one well-involved room, or any fire that has the potential to spread beyond the room of origin is a serious fire, requiring aggressive ventilation as much as aggressive fire attack.

Can you think of any recent fires in "modern construction" townhouses, which ended up spreading to adjacent structures, or ended in a significant collapse? Is it possible that early, aggressive venting of the roof could have slowed the lateral spread of fire to the point where fire attack could have been effective? How about an incident where a civilian was trapped on the top floor of a townhouse with a relatively small fire, (one that had not yet accessed the void spaces, attic, or even reached the top floor), and incorrect ventilation tactics not only prematurely increased the size of a small fire, but doomed the victim with a growing toxic condition caused by mushrooming on the top floor? Could that victim have benefited from a well-placed vent opening in the roof?

Horizontal ventilation can be an effective tool in combating structural fires, as can vertical ventilation. The problem our department has today is that we don’t understand the difference between the two tactics, which results in the blind application of techniques, with little or no thought as to the consequences of our actions. As discouraging as it may be to some, there is not a book you can read, or a class you can take, or a "quick reference chart" you can follow that will give you a universal technique that works in all situations.